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REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION IN NEW YORK:
WHEN IS A BIBLE SOCIETY NOT RELIGIOUS?
In 1970 the United States Supreme Court decided that it was constitutional
for states to include churches and religious institutions within the categories of
organizations exempt from real property taxes. I A recent series of decisions by
the state courts in New York presents a much more troublesome question:
what kind of distinctions may a state legislature constitutionally draw be-
tween various types of religious organizations in its attempt to prevent undue
erosion of the property tax base?
Since 1938 New York has grounded exemptions for religious, charitable
and educational organizations in the state's constitution. 2 However, from
colonial times, New York has provided for real property tax exemptions for
these and other groups.3 The present state tax statute is based on an 1896 law
which established that real property shall be tax-exempt if it is owned by a
corporation or an association organized and used exclusively for one or more
of seventeen specific purposes, including religious and bible or tract. 4 Up to
1971, the only change in the statute was to add "public playground" and "bar
association" to the tax-exempt categories. 5
During the twentieth century, the number of organizations enjoying tax
exemption burgeoned. 6 Not only could organizations obtain tax-exempt status
1. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
2. "Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may be
altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal peroperty used exclusively for
religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law and owned by any corporation or
association organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not operating
for profit." N.Y. Const. art. XVI, § 1 (McKinney 1969).
3. An example of an early tax exemption statute is Law of April 1, 1799, ch. LXXII, (17991
Laws of N.Y.: "That no house or land belonging to the United States, or to the people of this
state, nor any church or place of public worship, or any personal property belonging to any
ordained minister of the gospel, nor any college or incorporated academy, nor any school house,
court house, gaol, alms house or property belonging to any incorporated library, shall be taxed by
virtue of this act."
4. "The real property of a corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or
mental improvement of men or women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent,
missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, scientific, literary, library, patriotic, historical or
cemetery purposes, or for the enforcement of laws relating to children or animals, or for two or
more of such purposes, and used exclusively for carnying out thereupon one or more of such
purposes ... shall be exempt from taxation." Law of May 27, 1896, vol. I, ch 908, § 4(0, [1896]
Laws of N.Y.
5. See Law of April 23, 1958, vol. II, ch. 959, § 420(1), [1958] Laws of N Y
6. The problem of prolific tax exemptions is widely recognized throughout the country. "One
can easily show . . . that carelessness in preparing property rolls has frequently conferred tax
exempt status on property that qualifies nominally more than substantively. There are also a
growing number of communities that serve tax exempt facilities that bear a relatively high
proportion of total assessed realty. Communities whose primary economic activities revolve
around government or higher education find themselves in this tight situation The traditional
exemptions of realty have been so expanded that a new plane of vastly different dimensions
exists. Within this situation is found the highly profitable business property which is accorded tax
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pursuant to the tax statute or the constitution, but also by special act of the
legislature. Between 1900 and 1970, approximately 107 special acts were passed
which either added, consolidated or amended tax exemptions. 7 In 1970 the
Legislative Committee to Study and Investigate Real Property Tax Exemptions
found that if the average annual increases of tax-exempt property were to
continue at the present rate, within fifteen years "50 percent of the total assessed
value of all real property in New York State will be exempt .. ."S This forecast
is particularly alarming in light of the fact that the current quantity of tax-exempt
real property already places a significant financial burden on all municipalities
within the state. 9
Based on these findings, the committee recommended a change in the tax
statute, and, in 1971, the legislature adopted the committee's recommenda-
tions and amended the New York Real Property Tax Law.' 0 Part l(a) of the
statute provides for an unqualified tax exemption for the real property owned
by corporations or associations organized or conducted exclusively for one of
six purposes: "religious, charitable, hospital, educational, moral or mental
improvement of men, women or children or cemetery purposes . ... "1
Additionally, the real property in question must be used exclusively for
carrying out similar purposes.1 2 Because the statute continues tax exemption
exempt status when acquired by . . . religious . . . associations." Becker, Property Tax Problems
Confronting State and Local Governments, in State and Local Tax Problems 34, 39 (H. Johnson
ed. 1969). The property in question would be "highly profitable" to the municipality if taxed
either because it constitutes a significant amount of property within the municipality's boundaries
or it occupies a strategic business location within the municipality.
7. 15 N.Y. Legis. Doc. 20 (1970).
8. Id. at 35-36.
9. Id. at 34-35. The problem has shown no signs of abating since 1970. Recently published
figures show that the Unification Church, commonly known as the Moon Sect, presently owns
real estate valued conservatively at $25 million. (This value reflects the market value; the
assessed valuation for tax purposes is significantly higher.) Most of the church's property is
located in New York State and California, but there are "outposts" in almost every state. N.Y.
Times, September 19, 1976, § 8, at 1, col. 1. Half of the citizens of Hardenburgh, N.Y., a town
in the Catskill Mountains, have been ordained as ministers so as to achieve limited tax-exempt
status in protest of the amount of tax-exempt property within their community. (The degrees were
purchased from the Universal Life Church, a California organization profiting from the frustra-
tion of U.S. taxpayers.) "The total assessed value of property in Hardenburgh is $21 million, and
$5 million of that is tax-exempt." The town's 236 residents must bear the resultant fiscal
burden-in the past six years taxes have increased three to four times. The ordinations were
planned to alert the State Legislature to the severity of the problem. Id., § 1, at 1, col. 1.
10. N.Y. Legis. Doc., supra note 7, at 40; N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §§ 421(l)(a) & (b)
(McKinney 1972).
11. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 421(1)(a) (McKinney 1972): "Real property owned by a
corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital,
educational, moral or mental improvement of men, women or children or cemetery purposes, or
for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of
such purposes either by the owning corporation or association ... as hereinafter provided shall be
exempt from taxation as provided in this section." Id.
12. Id.
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for the real property of religious, educational and charitable organizations,
Article XVI of the state constitution has not been violated. 13
Section 421(1)(b) of the statute contains provisions designed to limit the
growing number of tax exemptions. It provides for a qualified tax exemption
for the real property owned by those corporations or associations not or-
ganized or conducted exclusively for the six purposes enumerated in section
421(1)(a), but for one of fourteen other purposes, including bible, tract, and
missionary purposes. 14 The tax exemption for these organizations is qualified
in the sense that these groups are exempt from taxation by the state, but the
municipal corporation within which any real property of the organization is
located is empowered to take away the exemption through adoption of a local
law. 15
Pursuant to the grant of power provided in section 421(1)(b), New York
City enacted New York City Local Law No. 46 in 197116 denying tax-exempt
status to real property belonging to all organizations listed in section
421(1)(b). 17 The Tax Commission of the City of New York notified many
previously exempted organizations of their new tax status effective January 1,
1972.18 Litigation challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality of section 421
was initiated by several of these organizations. ' 9 This Note will survey those
13. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
14. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 421 (1)(b) (McKinney 1972); "Real property owned by a
corporation or association which is not organized or conducted exclusively for religious, charita-
ble, hospital, educational, moral or mental improvement of men, women or children or cemetery
purposes, or for two or more such purposes, but which is organized or conducted exclusively for
bible, tract, benevolent, missionary, infirmary, public playground, scientific, literary, bar associ-
ation, medical society, library, patriotic or historical purposes, for the enforcement of laws
relating to children or animals, or for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for
carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes either by the owning corporation or
association, or by another such corporation or association as hereinafter provided, shall be
exempt from taxation; provided, however, that such property shall be taxable by any municipal
corporation within which it is located if the governing board of such municipal corporation .
adopts a local law . . . so providing." Id.
15. Id.
16. "Taxation of property of non-profit organizations, pharmaceutical societies and dental
societies.-1. Real Property owned by a corporation or association which is not organized or
conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital, educational or cemetery purposes, or for
two or more such purposes, but which is organized or conducted exclusively for the moral or
mental improvement of men and women or for bible, tract, benevolent, missionary, infirmary,
public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic or
historical purposes, for the enforcement of laws relating to children or animals, or for two or more
such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes
either by the owning corporation or association, or by another such corporation or association...
shall be taxable." New York City Administrative Code § J51-3.0 (1975).
17. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
18. Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn, 71 Misc. 2d 401, 336 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1972).
19. The statute has been attacked as being void for vagueness, Association of the Bar v.
Lewisohn, 71 Misc. 2d 401, 409, 336 N.Y.S.2d 338, 347 (1972), aff'd mem., 41 App. Div. 2d
1026, 344 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1st Dep't), rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 143, 313 N.E.2d 30, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555
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cases which have challenged the statute and examine the manner in which the
New York courts have answered, or failed to answer, the various constitu-
tional issues raised.
THE INITIAL CASES
The cases of Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn 20 and Explorers Club v.
Lewisohn21 were the first Court of Appeals decisions which interpreted the
statute. Both organizations claimed that their property was entitled to unqual-
ified exemptions pursuant to section 421(l)(a)22 because it was owned by a
charitable or educational organization and used exclusively for such pur-
poses. 23 They also argued that if the statute denied them an exemption it was
violative of their constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process
of the law. 24
(1974); violative of equal protection, Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn, 34 N.Y.2d 143, 156,
313 N.E.2d 30, 36-37, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555, 564 (1974); unduly inhibiting free exercise of religion,
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Lewisohn, 35 N.Y.2d 92, 315 N.E.2d 801, 358 N.Y.S.2d
757 (1974); America Press, Inc. v. Lewisohn, 74 Misc. 2d 562, 345 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1973),
aff'd mem., 48 App. Div. 2d 798, 372 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Ist Dep't 1975); and as violative of tile
establishment clause, Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Lewisohn, 35 N.Y.2d 92, 315
N.E.2d 801, 358 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1974); America Press, Inc. v. Lewisohn, 74 Misc. 2d 562, 345
N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd mem., 48 App. Div. 2d 798, 372 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't
1975).
20. 34 N.Y.2d 143, 313 N.E.2d 30, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1974).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 149, 313 N.E.2d at 32, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
23. Id. at 149, 313 N.E.2d at 32, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 558. The Bar Association felt its legal
educational services to the general public entitled it to classification as an educational organiza-
tion. The Explorers Club cited the conduct of its educational program for high school students.
Each based its claim of being a charitable or educational organization on the theory that their
activities conferred a public benefit. Id. at 153-54, 313 N.E.2d at 34-35, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62.
24. Id. at 156-S7, 313 N.E.2d at 36-37, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 564-65. The Explorers Club was
organized to spread exploration knowledge and to maintain a library on exploration and travel.
34 N.Y.2d at 150, 313 N.E.2d at 33, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 559. Its principal activities included
maintaining such a library, engaging in exploration and research in the earth sciences, financially
supporting scientific expeditions and conducting an educational program for high school students.
Id. at 150, 313 N.E.2d at 30, 33-34, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60. The Club lost at the trial level
because Special Term decided that the Club's educational activities were incidental to its
primarily scientific activities. 42 App. Div. 2d 537, 538, 344 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (1st Dep't 1973).
Thus, Special Term classified the Club as being organized and conducted exclusively for scientific
purposes and not for educational purposes, thereby denying the Club unqualified tax-exempt
status pursuant to section 421(1)(a). Id. The Appellate Division reversed, reasoning that research
is necessary for education so that even though the Club engages in scientific research, such
research is for educational purposes. Id. The Club's educational and scientific activities could not
be considered separately. Id.
The Bar Association won at both the trial level and in the Appellate Division. 71 Misc. 2d 401,
336 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd mem., 41 App. Div. 2d 1026, 344 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Ist
Dep't 1973), rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 143, 313 N.E.2d 30, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1974). The lower court
concluded that the use of the petitioner's property was exclusively for bar association purposes
and simultaneously exclusively for educational and charitable purposes. 71 Misc. 2d 401, 412-13,
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In an opinion deciding both cases, the Court of Appeals denied the
exemption to both petitioners and found the statute to be constitutional.25 The
court set out determinative factors for classifying organizations under the
statute. First the court examined the content of each organization's statement
of purpose to determine if either of them was organized for educational or
charitable purposes. It concluded that the Bar Association was organized for
bar association purposes and the Explorers Club for scientific purposes.2 6
The court noted that the prior tax-exempt classifications which both organiza-
tions had enjoyed 27 were precisely the classifications now falling within the
qualified exemption part of the statute. 28 The court rejected petitioners' claims
to unqualified exemptions as charitable or educational institutions, pointing
out that neither of them had ever before made such a claim.2 9 The Court of
Appeals then reversed the lower courts, holding that exclusively classifying an
organization in only one category when it also pursued purposes of another
category would render the statute void for vagueness. 30 It stated that" 'exclu-
sive', as used in the context of these exemption statutes . . . [connotes]
'principal' or 'primary.' ",31 Incidental purposes will not defeat exemption nor
will they entitle the taxpayer to exemption. 32 Thus, the court established a
third determinative factor: the principal activities of each organization. The
petitioners' bar association and scientific activities were found to be their
principal activities and their educational and charitable functions were
deemed to be incidental and peripheral. 33
336 N.Y.S.2d 338, 350 (Sup. Ct. 1972). (The organization maintained an extensive law library,
made recommendations on candidates for judicial office, investigated misconduct by members of
the Bar, made recommendations regarding legislation and provided legal assistance for the poor.
34 N.Y.2d 143, 149-50, 313 N.E.2d 30, 33, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555, 558-59 (1974).) It also stated that
if the classifications within the statute were interpreted in accordance with the city's view as
being mutually exclusive-i.e., no organization classified in part (1)(a) s religious could also be
classifed in part (1)(b) as bible and missionary-the statute would be void for vagueness. 71 Misc.
2d at 411, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 349. The mutual exclusivity approach would require that in
order for an organization to be exclusively religious it must not engage in any activities which
involve the use of the Bible or that for an organization to be exclusively educational it may not
carry on any scientific or literary activities or maintain a library. Id. at 410, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
Such an interpretation of the statute would prohibit a reasonable man from knowing what is
expected of him. Id. at 411, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
The court also determined that the city's argument would render the statute void for "internal
inconsistency and repugnancy ... for containing provisions which are inharmonious, conflicting,
contradictory, and irreconcilable, thusly rendering the statutes incapable of interpretation and
enforcement." Id. at 411, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
25. 34 N.Y.2d 143, 313 N.E.2d 30, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1974).
26. Id. at 153-54, 313 N.E.2d at 35-36, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 562-63.
27. The Bar Association was classified as a bar association and the Explorers Club as a
scientific organization. Id. at 154-55, 313 N.E.2d at 35-36, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 562-63.
28. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
29. 34 N.Y.2d 151, 313 N.E.2d 34, 356 N.Y.S.2d 560.
30. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
31. 34 N.Y.2d at 153, 313 N.E.2d at 35, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 561 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 153, 313 N.E.2d at 35, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62.
33. Id. at 153-54, 313 N.E.2d at 35-36, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 562-63.
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The court briefly examined the constitutional issues and concluded that the
statute did not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the
federal or state constitutions. The court asserted that the state is permitted to
select the property it shall tax or exempt from taxes as long as the selection
has a reasonable basis. The Constitution only prohibits "arbitrary or invidious
classifications. ' 34 The court placed heavy emphasis on the legislative deter-
mination that the overwhelming profusion of tax exemptions placed an undue
financial burden on local governments and their taxpayers. 35 Action was
therefore necessitated to halt the erosion of municipal tax bases.3 6
It is important to note that the constitutionality of the statute was estab-
lished when the facts involved did not concern a religious organization.
Therefore, first amendment issues were not considered.
The first case to challenge the statute on first amendment grounds was
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, Inc. v. Lewisohn.37 The Society was
placed on the New York City tax rolls as of January 1, 1972 as a bible, tract
or missionary society under part (1)(b). 38 Special Term reinstated its exemp-
tion as a religious organization 39 and the Appellate Division and Court of
Appeals agreed. 40 In rendering its decision the Court of Appeals added two
more factors for determining classification under the statute:4 1 the organiza-
tion's corporate name and the specific law under which the organization was
incorporated. The court held that even though the Society's corporate name
included the words "Bible and Tract Society," such nomenclature was not
determinative of the Society's purposes.42 Neither was "[t]he fact that the
[organization] is incorporated under the Membership Corporations Law in-
stead of the Religious Corporations Law ... decisive" in determining whether
or not the corporation is organized or conducted exclusively for religious
purposes .43
34. Id. at 156, 313 N.E.2d at 37, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
35. Id. at 156-57, 313 N.E.2d at 37, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 564-65.
36. The court noted the Joint Legislative Committee's figures showing that in 1967 more than
30 per cent of the assessed value of all real property throughout the state was tax-exempt and, in
New York City, the percentage was 33.2. Id. at 155, 313 N.E.2d at 36, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
The court concluded that the legislature, by enacting the statute, clearly intended to halt this
financial burden on the cities by permitting municipalities to end tax exemptions for any
non-profit organizations other than the specific few listed in part (1)(a). Id. at 155-56, 313 N.E.2d
at 36, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 563-64.
37. 169 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1973, at 16, cols. 1-2 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd, 43 App. Div. 2d 666,
349 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1st Dep't 1973), aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 92, 315 N.E.2d 801, 358 N.Y.S.2d 757
(1974).
38. 169 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1973, at 16, cols. 1-2 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
39. Id. at col. 2.
40. 43 App. Div. 2d 666, 349 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1st Dep't 1973), aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 92, 315
N.E.2d 801, 358 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1974).
41. See notes 25-33 supra and accompanying text.
42. 35 N.Y.2d at 97, 315 N.E.2d at 803, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
43. Id. at n.2, 315 N.E.2d at 803 n.2, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 760 n.2, quoting Outer Court v.
Miller, 161 Misc. 603, 609, 292 N.Y.S. 674, 681 (1936), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 814, 10 N.Y.S.2d
208, aff'd, 280 N.Y. 825, 21 N.E.2d 881 (1939). The New York Religious Corporations Law is
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Prior cases, though not involved with the tax-exempt issue, had already
determined that the Society is the governing board of a religious denomina-
tion44 and thus entitled to full first amendment protection. Case law had also
determined that the Jehovah's Witnesses' house-to-house preaching method
was religious activity entitled to first amendment protection.4 5 From these
precedents, the court concluded that the Society was organized and conducted
exclusively for religious purposes and entitled to tax exemption within the
contemplation of the statute." However, since tax-exempt status was re-
stored, the first amendment challenges to the statute's constitutionality were
never reached. 47
In America Press, Inc. v. Lewisohn, a case which did not reach the Court
of Appeals, an organization affiliated with a recognized religious denomina-
tion, the Roman Catholic Church, had its tax-exempt status reinstated.4 8
America Press publishes America, a weekly magazine, and Catholic Mind, a
monthly magazine. The group was organized in 1909 at the behest of the
general superior of the Jesuit order.49 The property in question serves as the
residence for priests who publish the two magazines. The priests also hold
religious services and conduct the activities of the John La Farge Institute,
which is devoted to ecumenical and interracial concerns.5 0 The city's conten-
tion was that the publications consisted primarily of secular articles dealing
with political and economic issues' and, therefore, the organization was
conducted exclusively for bible, tract or missionary purposes.5 2 The Appellate
Division answered this argument rather forcefully:
It is clear.. . that the court is invited to join the argument of semantics as it pertains
to what is, or is not, religious activity or exclusively religious activity. More particu-
still in effect. N.Y. Relig. Corps. Law (McKinney 1952). The Membership Corporations Law
referred to in the text was repealed .in 1969 and its subject matter is now covered by the
Not-For-Profit Corporation Law. N.Y. Not-For-Profit Corp. Law § 101 (McKinney 1970)
(Historical Note).
44. See Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); Fowler v. Rhode Island. 345 U.S. 67
(1953); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); United States ex rel. Hull v. Stalter, 151 F.2d 633
(7th Cir. 1945); People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 46 N.E.2d 329 (1943).
45. See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943); City of Anchorage v. Berry, 145 F. Supp. 868 (D. Alas. 1956), Donley v.
Colorado Springs, 40 F. Supp. 15 (D. Colo. 1941); People v. Barber 289 N.Y. 378, 46 N.E.2d
329 (1943). "This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First
Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim
to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion." Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943).
46. 35 N.Y.2d at 98, 315 N.E.2d at 804, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
47. Id. at 99, 315 N.E.2d at 804, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
48. 74 Misc. 2d 562, 345 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd mem., 48 App. Div. 2d 798,
372 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1975), appeal denied, 38 N.Y.2d 708 (1976).
49. 74 Misc. 2d at 566, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
50. Id.
51. 74 Misc. 2d at 563, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
52. See id.
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larly, it seems, the court is asked to sit in judgment as to the breadth of proper
religious and canonical activity vouchsafed to the man of the cloth and when, if at all,
he oversteps the bounds of religious call.
5 3
The court determined that America Press was not organized exclusively for
bible, tract or missionary purposes5 4 nor could the organization be deemed a
"separate, divisible nonreligious activity of the Jesuits." s "Tax exemption
may not be based . . . upon the carving out of activities from a larger
group. '5 6 The court also cited precedent supporting the same contention that
had been determinative in Watchtower: the furtherance of religion through
publications is a religious activity entitled to the same first amendment
protection as other forms of religious preaching.5 7 It should be noted that, as
in Watchtower, the return of America Press' tax-exempt status meant that the
issue of the constitutionality of section 421 was not reached. 58
PUBLISHING ORGANIZATION v. RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATION: THE NEW YORK STANDARD
The recent decisions of American Bible Society v. Lewisohn5 9 and Sweden-
borg Foundation, Inc. v. Lewisohn60 have highlighted the controversial
nature of the exemption statute. Both organizations were denied restoration of
their tax-exempt status even though they asserted that their activities were
religious in nature. Special Term had found that the activities of the Society
consisting primarily of distribution of the Bible, are exclusively religious even though
they are simultaneously exclusively "Bible."
[T]o say ... that religious and bible are mutually exclusive is to deny reality. One is
an integral part of the other, and they cannot be considered separately. 6 1
The Appellate Division reversed. It found that the Society was organized
exclusively for bible purposes and that any incidental religious or educational
53. Id. at 563, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 398-99.
54. Id. at 567, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
55. Id. at 568, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
56. Id. at 570, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
57. Id. at 566, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
58. Since the Court of Appeals denied the city's petition for appeal, the Appellate Division's
decision stands. 38 N.Y.2d 708 (1976). The city's petition to appeal the Appellate Division's
decision regarding the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the United States of America was also denied. See In re Domestic & Foreign
Missionary Soc'y v. Lewisohn, 169 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1973, at 16, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd
mem., 48 App. Div. 2d 1013, 372 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1975), appeal denied, 38 N.Y.2d 708
(1976). This society, like America Press, is affiliated with an established religious denomination.
59. 170 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1973, at 17, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1973), rev'd, 48 App. Div. 2d 308,
369 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1stDep't 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 78, 351 N.E.2d 697, 386 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976).
60. 171 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1974, at 2, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd per curiam, 48 App. Div.
2d 798, 369 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 87, 351 N.E.2d 702, 386 N.Y.S.2d
54 (1976).
61. 170 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 1973, at 17, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
[Vol. 45
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benefits were insufficient to classify it as a tax-exempt organization. 62 The
Court of Appeals agreed, holding that
a corporation organized and conducted exclusively for the purpose of publishing and
distributing the Holy Bible, when neither the corporation nor its corporate activity is
directly associated with an organized religious denomination or with an organization
having as its avowed purpose the furthering of a recognized religion.
63
is not entitled to an unqualified tax exemption.
The court began its analysis by considering the Society's original purpose
for incorporation64-one of the factors established in Bar Association for
classifying organizations under the statute. 65 It determined that the Society's
original purpose of " 'publishing and promoting a general circulation of the
holy scriptures, without note or comment' "66 remained as its current objec-
tive.6 7 The court then considered the Society's former tax-exempt status,
another factor set forth in Bar Association,s and concluded that the Amer-
ican Bible Society is organized and conducted exclusively for bible purposes
and not for religious or educational purposes even though the effects of its
activity will be the advancement of the Christian faith. 69
62. "The primary or main purpose of the petitioner is the dissemination or distribution of
bibles, and as such, it comes within the category of a bible society. . . . Accordingly, those
benefits which are derived incidentally as a result of petitioner's primary activity, whether they be
characterized as the promotion of religion, as the promotion of moral or mental improvement, or
as educational, cannot serve to cast petitioner into the exempt category." 48 App. Div. 2d at 312,
369 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
63. 40 N.Y.2d at 81, 351 N.E.2d at 698, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
64. 40 N.Y.2d at 82, 351 N.E.2d at 698, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
65. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
66. 40 N.Y.2d at 82, 351 N.E.2d at 698, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 50, quoting ch. 68, [1841] N.Y.
Laws.
67. Id.
68. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. The court rejected the appellant's argument
that the decision in People ex rel. American Bible Society v. Commissioners, 76 Hun. 491, 27
N.Y.S. 1058 (Sup. Ct. Ist Dep't) (per curiam), aff'd, 142 N.Y. 348, 37 N.E. 116 (1894), whereby
the Society first gained tax-exempt status, is binding precedent for the classification of the
American Bible Society as a religious organization. The court reasoned that the statute under
consideration was substantially different from the former statute, so res judicata was inapplicable.
40 N.Y.2d at 83-84, 351 N.E.2d at 700, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The stare decisis argument was also
precluded because the issue in the earlier case was the effective date of the tax statute in question
and not whether the American Bible Society was entitled to a tax exemption. See id. at 84, 351
N.E.2d at 700, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The court discussed the history of the tax statute pointing
out that in 1896 the classifications of bible and tract were added to the exempt classes and
concluded that the legislative intent in enacting the amendment was to grant tax exemption to
organizations "which would not have come under the pre-existing broad categorical umbrellas."
Id. Thus, exemption was guaranteed to corporations organized exclusively for bible purposes
regardless of whether or not they could be categorized as exclusively religious.
69. "There is, however, no reference in the Society's charter documents to Christianity or to
religion . . . . The promotion of religion in a broad or generic sense is the by-product of the
accomplishment of the Society's corporate Bible purpose." Id. at 85, 351 N.E.2d at 700-01, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 53.
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Watchtower was distinguished on the ground that the American Bible
Society had no corporate affiliation with any denomination whose purposes
were the furthering of a recognized religion nor were its bible activities
directly connected with any religious sect.70 The court again placed strong
emphasis on the legislature's intent in enacting section 421. It concluded that
this section was intentionally designed to distinguish between religious and
bible purposes and to allow bible societies to be taxed unless the particular
organization's bible purpose was obviously incidental to a primary religious
purpose. The court determined that the existence of "significant religious
overtones" to a bible society's bible activities will not exempt it from taxa-
tion. 7 1
The court dealt with the constitutional issues by citing Bar Association to
refute the due process and equal protection arguments. 72 The legislature's
intent to alleviate the fiscal problems of municipalities was held to be a
rational reason for the change in the tax structure.73 Bar Association was also
cited as support for the conclusion that the classifications within the statute
were neither irrational nor vague.74
In Swedenborg, the Swedenborg Foundation sought the return of its
tax-exempt status. The Foundation's activities primarily involved the publica-
tion and distribution of the religious and philosophical writings of Sweden-
borg, an eighteenth century Swedish theologian, scientist and philosopher.75
The Foundation also provided the Church of the New Jerusalem, a religious
organization following Swedenborg's teachings, with most of its copies of
Swedenborg's writings,7 6 although the New Church published its own books
of worship and hymnals. 77
The court began its analysis by considering the various factors it had
established in Bar Association78 and Watchtower."79 the corporate name of the
organization, the corporate purposes, the law under which it was incorpo-
rated, and the current principal activities of the organization.8 0 The court
70. Id.
71. Id. at 86, 351 N.E.2d at 701, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
72. Id.; See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
73. 40 N.Y.2d at 86, 351 N.E.2d at 701, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 53-54.
74. Id. at 86, 351 N.E.2d at 701-02, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
75. 40 N.Y.2d 91, 351 N.E.2d 704, 386 N.Y.S.2d 56.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 93-94, 351 N.E.2d at 705-06, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 57-58. See text accompanying notes
25-33 supra.
79. Id. at 94, 351 N.E.2d at 706, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 58. See text accompanying notes 41-43
supra.
80. The Foundation was originally incorporated "as 'The American Swedenborg Printing &
Publishing Society' under an 1848 act providing for the incorporation of 'benevolent, charitable,
scientific and missionary societies.' " 40 N.Y.2d at 90, 351 N.E.2d at 703, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 55
(citation omitted). The original corporate purposes were " 'the printing, publishing and circulat-
ing [of] the Theological Works and Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg for charitable and
missionary pruposes [sic].' " Id. The corporate name was changed to Swedenborg Foundation,
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then went on to find that the primary purpose of the Foundation was not
religious. This conclusion was based on the holding in American Bible Society
that "[n]either the corporation nor any corporate activity is directly associated
with an organized religious denomination or with an organization having as
its avowed purpose the furthering of a recognized religion." 8' Even though
most of the Foundation's 317 "life members" were simultaneously members of
the New Church, and all 16 of the Foundation's board of directors were
members of the New Church,8 2 the court found the two organizations to be
"legally unrelated."8 3
The Foundation's relationship with the New Church was deemed to be of
"incidental significance only" as compared to the relationship between the
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society and the Jehovah's Witnesses." No
religious purpose was stated in the Foundation's charter and "a significant
portion" of the Foundation's publications were scientific or philosophical
rather than theological.85 "The most that can be said is that the foundation
and the New Church share a common interest. '8 6 The court's treatment of the
constitutional issues in Swedenborg was simply to reject the Foundation's
claims that it had been denied equal protection and due process citing
American Bible Society.87
Thus, to secure an exemption as a religious organization a publishing
organization must be able to prove an affiliation with a recognized religious
denomination. New York has promulgated a narrow definition of that affilia-
tion. In American Bible Society the court noted that there was no corporate
Inc. in 1928 and the purposes were expanded in detail. " 'That the purposes and powers of the
Society are to print, publish, circulate and distribute the theological, scientific and other works
and writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, for benevolent, charitable, scientific, missionary and
philanthropic purposes, as well as annotations, commentaries thereon and extracts therefrom,
and to purchase, sell, translate into any language, edit and advertise such works and writings, to
print, publish, circulate, purchase, or sell literature in agreement therewith or collateral thereto;
to acquire, prepare, publish and distribute biographies of EMANUEL SWEDENBORG, to hold
meetings, lectures, debates and conferences as a means of promoting interest in his writings and
teachings; to maintain reading-rooms, libraries, branches and stations for reference and study of
such writings and teachings in any part of the world; and to do such other lawful things as may
be incidental to the carrying into effect of the foregoing purposes and powers, which purposes and
powers shall be exercised without any pecuniary profit to any officer, member or employee of the
corporation except reasonable compensation for services in effecting one or more of such purposes
or powers.' " Id. at 90-91, 351 N.E.2d at 703-04, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 55-56.
81. Id. at 94, 351 N.E.2d at 706, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (citation omitted)
82. Id. at 91, 351 N.E.2d at 704, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
83. "The Church of The New Jerusalem is a legally unrelated religious organization espousing
the tenets and teachings of [Swedenborg]." Id.
84. Id. at 94, 351 N.E.2d at 706, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. "Finally we reject appellant's arguments predicted on asserted denials of equal protection
of the law and of due process (Matter of American Bible Soc. v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d 78, supra,
decided herewith)." Id. at 95, 351 N.E.2d at 707, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (emphasis omitted). See
text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
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affiliation between the Society and "an organized religious denomination or
with an organization having as its avowed purpose the furthering of a
recognized religion . , "88 The court also determined that the Society's
corporate activity-publication and distribution of the Bible-was not di-
rectly associated with a religious denomination or an organization furthering a
recognized religion.8 9 In Swedenborg, the court again noted that the Founda-
tion and the Church of the New Jerusalem were "legally unrelated." 90 While
an association did exist between these two organizations, 9 1 the Court of
Appeals determined that the Foundation's activity was not directly associated
with the New Church. 92 Thus either a legal relationship between the organi-
zation seeking tax-exempt status and a religious demonination or a direct
association between the activities of the organization and a religious denomi-
nation appear to be the essential alternative bases for affiliation.
EVALUATION
Under the American Bible Society/Swedenborg test the following result
seems plausible. Organization X's sole purpose, as set forth in its charter, and
its principal exclusive activity is to publish and distribute prayer and religious
books to the general public. However X could not be classified as a religious
organization under New York law unless a legal relationship existed between
X and an organized religious denomination or an organization whose purpose
is to further a recognized religion. In contrast, organization Y's sole purpose,
as set forth in its charter, and its principal exclusive activity is also to publish
and distribute prayer and religious books to the general public. However,
church Z owns stock of organization Y. Therefore, Y would be granted
tax-exempt status as a religious organization because it has a legal affiliation
with an organized religious denomination. Thus, under the New York test for
applying section 421, the classification of organizations as religious and the
subsequent granting of tax-exempt status may turn on whether the organiza-
tion conforms to a structural scheme required by the state.
Free Exercise
The argument can be made that insistence on a particular organizational
scheme violates the free exercise clause in that the state is interfering with the
right of religious organizations to structure themselves as they see fit and this
interference unconstitutionally infringes on the free exercise of religion.
The free exercise clause of the first amendment involves both the freedom
to believe and the freedom to act according to that belief. 93 The freedom to
believe is absolutely protected but the freedom to act may be regulated. The
test of such regulation is that it must attain a permissible end without unduly
infringing the free exercise of religion. 94
88. 40 N.Y.2d at 81, 351 N.E.2d at 698, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
89. Id.
90. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
92. 40 N.Y.2d at 94, 351 N.E.2d at 706, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
93. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
94. Id. at 303-04.
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While what is meant by undue infringement is far from clear, some relevant
precedent appears to indicate that the American Bible SocietylSwedenborg
corporate affiliation test violates the free exercise clause. In Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral,9" a schism developed between the Russian Orthodox
churches in the United States and the mother church in Russia. 96 The
Patriarch of Moscow and the Convention of American Churches both claimed
the right to administer the Saint Nicholas Cathedral in New York City. New
York attempted to settle this dispute by enacting legislation transferring the
administration of the United States Russian Orthodox churches to the Amer-
ican organization. 97 The New York law was struck down as "[i]t prohibits...
the free exercise of religion." 98 The court stated that religious organizations
should have the "power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government . . . ."99 In Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 100 the Court made clear that it makes no difference whether the
dispute is settled by legislative or judicial action: both forms of state interfer-
ence are prohibited by the first amendment.10 1
The rationale of Kedroff and Kreshik might well require that all religious
organizations have unfettered discretion to determine their organizational
structure. However, Kedroff is distinguishable from American Bible Society
and Swedenborg as the former involved a hierarchical church embroiled in a
controversy as to which group within the church governed the hierarchy. Had
the legislation not been struck down, state power would have been utilized
"for the benefit of one segment of a church."'10 2 Further, all institutions
involved were clearly churches or organized religious denominations. Neither
American Bible Society nor Swedenborg involved a conflict within the
hierarchy of a church; nor was there any danger that the state would be, in
deciding these cases, benefitting one segment of a church at the expense of
another. The issue was whether an organization should be recognized as being
religious as defined by law.
However, Kedroff's relevance to American Bible Society and Swedenborg
lies in its indication that the Court has taken a restrictive view of what actions
a state can take respecting the internal organization of religious institutions.
This approach was evidenced on various occasions,' 0 3 and was most recently
illustrated in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich. 1o0 There the
Court rejected what it termed earlier dictum which had indicated that
95. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
96. Id. at 100-06.
97. Id. at 97-99.
98. Id. at 107.
99. Id. at 116.
100. 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
101. Id. at 191.
102. 344 U.S. at 119. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out, "[wlhat is at stake here is the
power to exercise religious authority." Id. at 121 (concurring opinion).
103. Maryland and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mer.
Presby. Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1969).
104. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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decisions of hierarchical churches could be reviewed by the state judiciary if
they were arbitrary. 10 5 While Milivojevich is distinguishable from the Amer-
ican Bible Society and Swedenborg cases for the same reasons as Kedroff, it is
submitted that the Court's continuously asserted restrictive view as to what
actions a state may take respecting the internal structure of an organization
recognized to be religious' 0 6 may well cause it to condemn, as an undue
infringement on free exercise, New York's insistence that an organization
conform to a state imposed structural scheme in order to be deemed a
religious organization. It seems that upholding the American Bible Societyl
Swedenborg test would be allowing the state to do indirectly what cannot be
done directly.
However, the possibility exists that the statute does not unduly infringe on
free exercise. The Supreme Court has determined that "[t]o strike down,
without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect
burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make
unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating
latitude of the legislature."' 7 The state faces a dilemma in trying to delineate
between commercial publishing houses which publish Bibles and religious
books for economic profit and religious publishing houses which publish the
same materials for religious purposes. It may be, therefore, that the American
Bible Society/Swedenborg corporate affiliation test would withstand constitu-
tional analysis because the test leads to a permissible end without unduly
infringing the free exercise of religion.' 0 8
The free exercise argument may also fail in the absence of a finding that the
American Bible Society/Swedenborg test coerces organizations to follow its
structural mandates. In Kedroff, the legislative enactment demanded com-
pliance by the Eastern Orthodox Church, and in Kreshik a judgment man-
dated compliance. Under the New York tax statute an organization does not
have to comply with the American Bible Society/Swedenborg test: failure to
comply would merely mean payment of the same tax non-religious organiza-
tions pay. 10 9 However, while the statute on its face does not mandate
105. "[No 'arbitrariness' exception-in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the
highest eccelesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regula-
tions" exists. Id. at 715. For a thorough discussion of the Milivojevich case see 45 Fordham L.
Rev. 992 (1977).
106. "Indeed, final authority with respect to the promulgation and interpretation of all
matters of . . . internal organization rests with the Holy Assembly . 426 U.S. at 715-16
(emphasis deleted).
107. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
108. It should also be noted that the corporate affiliation test may be viewed as infringing on
the exercise of the entire Christian faith in New York State rather than on only one particular
denomination. If several denominations, in the spirit of ecumenism, organized an effort to
establish an inter-denominational publishing house without corporate ties to any individual
denomination, that publishing house would apparently be denied tax-exempt status. Thus, the
American Bible Society/Swedenborg test may effectively stymie ecumenical attempts within the
Christian faith.
109. The issue involved is not that the tax itself is an infringement on free exercise, rather the
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compliance, if the effect of the statute is to coerce compliance, a court must
analyze the statute's constitutionality as if it demanded compliance."10 The
Court has recognized that taxing a religious organization represents a bur-
den. 11 It follows that an organization will attempt to ease this burden
through conformity to the American Bible SocietylSwedenborg requirements.
Whether this natural tendency will rise to the level of state coercion is likely to
turn, in a particular case, on the ability of the organization in question to
prove it required the exemption to survive or, at least, would be severely
affected by not obtaining it.
Establishment Clause
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 112 the Court set forth three tests 1 3 for determining
whether a statute conforms with the establishment clause: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' ""'
While there is no doubt that section 421 has a valid legislative purpose-the
halting of the erosion of the tax base throughout the state-this is the only
"prong" of the Lemon test which does not present a problem.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion . . .over another .... Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organiza-
tions or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establish-
ment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church
and State. '115
Later cases have revealed that this "wall of separation" is not an absolute
one.11 6 There is "room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
neutrality"' 17 which is neither sponsorship nor hostility, but what will not be
use of the tax to coerce certain organizational structure. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 429-31 (1961).
110. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367 (1886).
ill. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
112. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
113. The use of the word test needs to be qualifiedi "There are always risks in treating criteria
discussed by the Court from time to time as 'tests' in any limiting sense of that term.
Constitutional adjudication does not lend itself to the absolutes of the physical sciences or
mathematics. The standards should rather be viewed as guidelines with which to identify
instances in which the objectives of the Religion Clauses have been impaired. And, as we have
noted... candor compels the acknowledgement that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries
of permissible government activity in this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication." Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) (citations omitted).
114. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citation omitted).
115. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
116. "The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
117. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
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tolerated is "either governmentally established religion or governmental inter-
ference with religion."' 18 Although this language seems clear, what will be
found to establish or interfere with religion is usually a close question, with
results altered by what might appear to be small factual differences.' 19 Thus,
recognizing that it is hazardous to place "too much weight on a few words or
phrases of the Court,"'120 it seems that an adjudication preferring religious
organizations which conform to a structural scheme imposed by the state is
probably unconstitutional. New York, through its refusal to declare an
organization religious based solely on its failure to conform to the structure
the state requires, appears, through the denial of tax exemptions, to be
"hostile" to these organizations. A state statute which tends to control the
form a religious organization must take suggests the "kind of involvement that
would tip the balance toward government control of churches ....
Thus far this Note has concentrated upon the definition of affiliation
promulgated in American Bible Society and Swedenborg as that of corporate
or legal affiliation. It should be noted, however, that the Court of Appeals has
stated that the affiliation must be with "an organized religious denomination
or with an organization having as its avowed purpose the furthering of a
recognized religion .... ,,122 The terms "organized" and "recognized" are
troublesome and seem to indicate that tax exemptions will only be granted to
those organizations affiliated with a state-recognized religion. The implication
that a state has the power to acknowledge that a religion exists but refuse to
recognize it is unconstitutional for the same reasons outlined in the above
establishment clause argument. 23 In fact, the Supreme Court, in upholding
the constitutionality of the granting of tax exemptions by New York to
religious organizations, stressed that no one religion or religious group was
singled out for special treatment. 124 Recognizing some religions and not others
would clearly contravene the directive against singling out certain religions.
However, the Court of Appeals in American Bible Society and Swedenborg
has not refused to recognize as religious any organization to which an
affiliation was claimed. Rather, the cases turned on affiliation, not recogni-
tion. Hopefully the word "recognized" will be deleted in future cases as it has
not been a determinative factor and, in light of the first amendment, cannot
be.
The second alternative of the American Bible Society/Swedenborg test-
that corporate activity of the organization seeking tax exemption be directly
118. Id.
119. Compare Illinois ex. rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) with Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); compare Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) with Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
120. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
121. Id.
122. American Bible Society v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d at 81, 351 N.E.2d at 698, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 50; Swedenborg Foundation, Inc. v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d at 94, 351 N.E.2d at
706, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
123. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
124. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
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associated with a religious denomination-violates the third prong of the
Lemon test 125 by fostering excessive government entanglements. In Lemon,
Rhode Island enacted a statute authorizing state officials to supplement
salaries of elementary school teachers of secular subjects.' 2 6 The statute was
struck down as, inter alia, it would require a "comprehensive, discriminating,
and continuing state surveillance" 127 to insure that a teacher was, in fact,
teaching secular subjects. By contrast, in Tilton v. Richardson,12 which
involved construction grants to higher educational facilities, no excessive
entanglements were found. The Court, inter alia, noted that the grants were
one-time expenditures and there were "no continuing financial relationships or
dependencies, no annual audits, and no government analysis of an institu-
tion's expenditures .... ,1*29 While none of these factors were controlling, 130
the absence of all three indicated that the entanglements were not signifi-
cant.1
3 1
The second alternative of the American Bible Society/Swedenborg test
necessitates a vague standard of affiliation to satisfy the obscure notion of a
"direct association." To enforce this standard, a state surveillance which is
comprehensive and discriminating would be mandated to insure that the
association is close enough to justify tax-exempt status. There would, most
likely, be annual audits and a "government analysis of an institution's
expenditures" 132 would be called for. Fact-finding hearings involving tes-
timony from the relevant officials are conceivable. Additionally, the state
surveillance is likely to be continuous. If, for example, an organization in
question succeeds in being declared religious for one year, the tax authorities
are free to challenge the exemption in a subsequent tax period, arguing that
the organization and its affiliated church have drifted apart. Conversely, if
the organization lost, the next year it may argue that the bonds between it and
its affiliated church have solidified. 133 Thus, in contrast to Tilton, there
would be "continuing financial relationships or dependencies . "... 134 In
sum, all the elements which caused the Lemon court to find excessive
entanglements would be present and all those elements whose absence led the
Tilton court to find no excessive entanglements would also be present.
There are, of course, times when a court must, as in Walz, make a choice
between two roads, each of which would cause some state contact with
religion. However, in Walz, one course-the failure to grant exemptions-
would lead to excessive entanglements, while the other-the granting of
exemptions-would not offend the establishment clause. Here, either attempt
to enforce the statute seems to violate the prohibition against the establish-
125. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
126. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971).
127. Id. at 619.
128. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
129. Id. at 688.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See People v. Haring, 286 App. Div. 676, 146 N.Y.S.2d 151 (3d. Dep't 1955).
134. 403 U.S. at 688.
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ment of religion: to employ the legal control test appears to advance or inhibit
religion, while the direct association test fosters excessive government entang-
lements.
The conclusion, then, appears inescapable: the attempt of section 421 to
separate organizations which publish religious material from religious organi-
zations has not succeeded. The borderline between these two types of organi-
zations is so vague that the statute cannot be enforced without violating the
establishment clause. Thus, section 421, in as much as it purports to do this,
is unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the question of what constitutes a religious organiza-
tion as defined by law is a complex area wherein the interests of the
economically-bereft municipalities clash with the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religion. It is no easy task to reconcile these forces. However, an
acceptable reconciliation is not obtained by avoiding the constitutional issues.
In neither American Bible Society nor Swedenborg did the Court of Appeals
fully address the constitutional issues involved in applying section 421 to
religious organizations. Undoubtably, the question will arise again; when it
does, the first amendment issues should be dealt with squarely.
Wendy E. Cooper
